Abstract. In this paper, we focus on the heterogeneity of social networks and its role to the emergence of prevailing cooperation and sustaining cooperators. The social networks are representative of the interaction relationships between players and their encounters in each round of games. We study an evolutionary Prisoner's Dilemma game on a variant of Newman-Watts small-world network, whose heterogeneity can be tuned by a parameter. It is found that optimal cooperation level exists at some intermediate topological heterogeneity for different temptations to defect. That is, frequency of cooperators peaks at some specific values of degree heterogeneity -neither the most heterogeneous case nor the most homogeneous one would favor the cooperators. Besides, the average degree of networks and the adopted update rule also affect the cooperation level.
Introduction
Evolutionary game theory has been well developed as an interdisciplinary science by researchers from biology, economics, social science, computer science for several decades.
In past few years, it also gained the interests of physicists to study some phenomena and intriguing mechanisms in a e-mail: fufeng@pku.edu.cn b e-mail: longwang@pku.edu.cn well-mixed population by using mean-field theory of statistical physics. In classic game theory, the players are assumed to be completely rational and try to maximize their utilities according to opponents' strategies. Under these assumptions, in the Prisoner's Dilemma game (PD game), two players simultaneously decide whether to cooperate (C) or to defect (D). They both receive R upon mutual cooperation and P upon mutual defection. A de- fector exploiting a C player gets T , and the exploited cooperator receives S, such that T > R > P > S and 2R > T + S. As a result, it is best to defect regardless of the co-player's decision. Thus, defection is the evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS), even though all individuals would be better off if they cooperated. Thereby this creates the social dilemma, because when everybody defects, the mean population payoff is lower than that when everybody cooperates. However, cooperation is ubiquitous in natural systems from cellular organisms to mammals. In the past two decades, some extensions on PD game have been considered to elucidate the underlying mechanisms boosting cooperation behaviors by which this dilemma could be resolved. For instance, depart from the wellmixed population scenario, Nowak and May considered PD game on spatially structured population [1] . All individuals are constrained to play only with their immediate neighbors. They found that spatial structure enhances the ability of cooperators to resist invasion by defectors.
The successful development of network science provides a systematic framework for studying the dynamics processes taking place on complex networks [2, 3] . For most networks, including the World Wide Web, the Internet, and the metabolic networks, they have small-world property and are demonstrated to be scale-free [4, 5] . The network theory is a natural and convenient tool to describe the population structure on which the evolution of cooperation is studied. Each vertex represents an individual and the edges denote links between players in terms of game dynamical interaction. Trivially, one could conclude that both well-mixed population and spatiallystructured population are represented by regular graphs.
It is, however, unrealistic to assume the real world is as homogeneous as regular graphs. Furthermore, as aforementioned, many real-world networks of interactions are heterogeneous, namely, different individuals have different numbers of average neighbors with whom they interact.
In [6] , Abramson and Kuperman studied a simple model of an evolutionary version of the Prisoner's Dilemma game played in small-world networks. They found that defectors prevail at some intermediate rewiring probability. By introducing the volunteering participation, Szabó et al. investigated the spatio-temporal diagrams of the evolutionary process within the context of rewired lattices which have small-world property [7] . Other paradigms of game with spatially-structured population or on graphs, such as snowdrift game, rock-scissors-paper game, public goods game, etc, have been studied [8, 9, 10] .
Recently, Santos and Pacheco discovered that in scalefree networks, the cooperators become dominant for entire range of parameters in evolutionary PD game and snowdrift game [11] . They also demonstrated that the enhancement of cooperation would be inhibited whenever the correlations between individuals are decreased or removed.
Being similar to Hamilton's rule, Ohtsuki et al described a simple rule for evolution of cooperation on graphs and social networks -the benefit-to-cost ratio exceeds the average number of neighbors [12] . In [13, 14] , Santos suggested that the heterogeneity of the population structure, especially scale-free networks, provides a new mechanism for cooperators to survive. Moreover, cooperators are capable of exploiting the heterogeneity of the network of interactions, namely, finally occupy the hubs of the networks.
Besides, Vukov and Szabo studied the evolutionary PD game on hierarchical lattices and revealed that the highest stationary frequency of cooperators occurs in some intermediate layers [15] . Some researchers have studied minority game [16] , with small-world interactions [17] , with emergent scale-free leadership structure [18] , etc. Howbeit, these works are mostly studied on crystalized (static) networks, i.e., the topology of network is not affected by the dynamics on it. Therefore, adapting the network topology dynamically in response to the dynamic state of the nodes should be taken into account. Evolutionary games with "adaptive" network structure have been investigated by some researchers [19, 20] .
In this paper, we consider evolutionary PD game on a variant of Newman-Watts (NW) small-world network.
As is known, the NW small-world network is moderately homogeneous. In order to investigate the heterogeneity's role in the emergence of cooperation for different temptations to defect, some artificial heterogeneity in network degree sequences is introduced. Namely, some nodes are ran- The degree of heterogeneity of the network is computed as 
Evolutionary Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) game
Since the pioneering work on iterated games by Axelrod [23] , the evolutionary Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) game has been a general metaphor for studying the cooperative behavior. In the evolutionary PD game, the individuals are pure strategists, following two simple strategies: cooperate (C) and defect (D). The spatial distribution of strategies is described by a two-dimensional unit vector for each player x, namely,
for cooperators and defectors, respectively. Each individual plays the PD game with its "neighbors" defined by their who-meets-whom relationships and the incomes are accumulated. The total income of the player at the site x can be expressed as
where the Ω x denotes the neighboring sites of x, and the sum runs over neighbor set Ω x of the site x. Without loss of the generic feature of PD game, the payoff matrix has a rescaled form, suggested by Nowak and May [24] 
where 1 < b < 2. In evolutionary games the players are allowed to adopt the strategy of one of their more successful neighbors. Then the individual x randomly selects a neighbor y for possibly updating its strategy. Since the success is measured by the total payoff, whenever P y > P x the site x will adopt y's strategy with probability given by [11]
where k > is the largest between site x's degree k x and y's k y . This microscopic updating rule is some kind of imitation process that is similar to Win-Stay-Lose-Shift rules in spirit. Unlike the case of bounded rationality, such proportional imitation (the take-over probability is proportional to the payoff difference of the two sites) does not allow for an inferior strategy to replace a more successful one.
Simulation results and discussions
Evolutionary PD game is performed analogically to replicator dynamics: in each generation, all directly connected pairs of individuals x and y engage in a single round game and their accumulated payoffs are denoted by P x and P y respectively. The synchronous updating rule is adapted here. Whenever a site x is updated, a neighbor y is chosen at random from all k x neighbors. The chosen neighbor bors with some long range shortcuts making the average length short. Therefore, the defection of some node is easily spread from one node to another through the shortcuts. The average degree of HNW network k = 2κ+2m/N .
It is believed that average degree affects the evolution of cooperation. Fig. 7 plots the frequency of cooperators versus N h /N corresponding to different shortcuts number m = 800, 1000, 1200 respectively with b = 1.1. We find that increasing average degree (larger m) promotes cooperation on the network. Nevertheless, we should point out that with sufficient large m which makes the network nearly fully-connected, the cooperation will be inhibited due to mean-field behavior [25] . On the other hand, when m changes, our above conclusion on the effect of heterogeneity to cooperation is still valid. We can see in Fig. 7 that, for different fixed m and b, ρ C still peaks at certain
We further explore the situation where we adopt another microscopic update rule different from Eq. 4. In stead of updating the strategies according to the accumulated payoff of individuals, we consider using the average payoff of individual x, P x = Px kx . Thus the new update rule is:
By such update rule, we report the results in Fig. 8 4 Conclusion remarks and future work
In conclusion, we have studied the effect of topological heterogeneity to the evolution of cooperation behavior in evolutionary Prisoner's Dilemma game. It is found that frequency of cooperation peaks at some specific value of N h /N , that is, neither the most heterogeneous case nor the most homogeneous one would favor cooperators. We found that the network degree heterogeneity is one of the factors affecting the emergence of cooperation. Besides, the average degree and the adopted update rule also play a role to cooperation. Therefore, it is meaningful and necessary to explore the underlying factors that do matter the emergence of cooperation behaviors. In addition, the interplay between game dynamics and network topologies is an interesting topic for further investigations. 
